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This paper focuses on strategic information flows between
buyers and suppliers within logistics supply chain relation-
ships and on subsequent relationship-specific performance
outcomes.  Our analysis of dyadic data collected from 91
buyer–supplier logistics relationships finds that buyer and
supplier strategic information flows positively impact the
relationship-specific performance of both sharing and
receiving parties.  Specifically, each party gains financially
from improved management of assets, reduced costs of
operations, and enhanced productivity.  Moreover, each
benefits operationally from improved planning, control, and
flexibility of resources.  Buyer dependence on the supplier
increases buyer strategic information flows to the supplier. 
Additionally, buyer IT customization and both buyer and sup-
1Vivek Choudhury was the accepting senior editor for this paper.  France
Belanger served as the associate editor.
plier trusting beliefs in the receiving party positively impact
strategic information sharing with partners.  This study
suggests that partnerships for supply chain services engage
in cooperative initiatives to generate relational rents and are
an alternative to conventional “arms length” transactional
exchanges.  These partnerships need to be motivated to go
beyond the sharing of order-related information (which must
occur in transactional exchanges) and to share strategic
information (which has the potential for both additional rent
generation and risks of misappropriation).
Keywords:  Interfirm relationships, dyads, relational view,
strategic information flows, IT customization, trust, depen-
dence, relationship longevity, organization size
Introduction
Supply chain vendors have introduced business-to-business
(B2B) information technology solutions (Klein 2007; Richard
and Devinney 2005) to support buyer relationships (Malhotra
et al. 2005; Straub 2004) that range from transactional
exchanges to collaborative partnerships (Dwyer et al. 1987). 
Focusing on collaborative partnerships, the relational view of
the firm (Dyer and Singh 1998) posits that participants
generate relational rents through such value-adding initiatives
as information exchanges across firms.  Indeed, IT plays an
instrumental role in logistics relationships, as the information
shared between partners shapes how relationships are main-
tained and developed (Jayachandran et al. 2005).  While the
differences in the opportunities to share information as
relationships transition from transactional to collaborative
have been discussed (Richard and Devinney 2005), there has
been scant scholarly attention on the outcomes of sharing
private, strategic information and on the appropriation of
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gains by buyers and suppliers.  Furthermore, the relational
and technological context that promotes such information
sharing requires further examination since safeguarding
against opportunism presents a major challenge (Patnayakuni
et al. 2006).  Thus, while the options available to share
information in buyer–supplier logistics supply chain relation-
ships have expanded, our understanding of the forces that
guide these behaviors has not.
To address this void in our understanding, we focus on the
forces that shape information sharing behaviors in logistics
supply chain relationships, which we simply refer to as
logistics relationships.  In these relationships, a buyer partners
with a supplier for the efficient and timely movement of raw
materials, components, finished goods, and finances.  In fact,
these relationships are established to manage the flow of three
key resources (i.e., information, goods, and finances) across
the supply chain (Chen et al. 2000; Kulp et al. 2004).  Thus,
while firms are developing supply chain relationships for a
variety of processes, such as contract manufacturing, distribu-
tion, or new product development, logistics relationships
represent an especially interesting context to understand how
information sharing behaviors can be promoted.  The logistics
process is inherently intensive in its use of physical assets and
information and requires the management of high process
interdependence between buyers and suppliers.  Given these
characteristics, the logistics industry has seen rapid-fire IT
innovation to capture, share, and utilize information better as
well as to enable the management of process interdependence
between parties.
Past supply chain research has shown how the sharing of
order-related information reduces the upstream amplification
of errors in forecasting demand signals and reduces the
bullwhip effect (Lee et al. 2000).  Research also suggests that
there is value to sharing strategic information, such as
information on production strategies, financial operations, and
marketing, which is above and beyond the order-related
information required for transactional exchanges.  The
rationale is that the sharing of such information can enable
partnering firms to align strategic actions and adapt their plans
and resource positions.  For instance, the sharing of sales and
inventory information should enable suppliers to better fore-
cast demand and plan production (Seidmann and Sundararajan
1997), especially when demand information cannot accurately
be obtained by an analysis of historic order data.  However,
limited empirical evidence exists with respect to the sharing
of the forms of private information that are deemed strategic
and to their impacts.
The exchange of strategic information with partners is not,
however, without risks.  Consider these illustrations.  A buyer
may share information on its inventory positions with its
supplier to inform their production schedule and to facilitate
vendor-managed inventory.  In doing so, the buyer might be
subject to higher pricing due to the visibility of its inventory
positions that the supplier now has.  A buyer sharing its
demand information and marketing strategies with its logistics
vendor to enable the vendor to plan capacity better and
manage peak periods might be subject to less favorable
volume discounts by the vendor.  Finally, a vendor may share
cost and margin structures with a buyer to measure improve-
ments in the business value that is jointly created in an effort
to better coordinate interfirm activities.  In the absence of
strict confidentiality agreements, the buyer might disclose
such shared information to other vendors in order to secure
more competitive bids from them.
Accordingly, how does the sharing of strategic information by
either buyers or suppliers impact the outcomes realized by
each party? Specifically, we are interested in buyer and
supplier outcomes that directly result from participation in
such exchanges, which we term relationship-specific
performance.  While the potential for these outcomes is
important in order to rationalize the sharing of strategic
information, how should firms evaluate whether favorable
conditions exist to exchange such information with partners?
Here, we explore factors that motivate and enable the sharing
of strategic information and that alleviate risk concerns
associated with such sharing.  In examining these abiding
issues, we draw on the relational view of the firm (Dyer and
Singh 1998), which focuses on the potential of interfirm
initiatives to generate relational rents.  This view suggests that
specific characteristics of collaborative partnerships—namely,
information/knowledge exchanges, complementary resources
or capabilities, relational asset specific investments, and
effective governance—directly (e.g., through information ex-
changes) and indirectly (e.g., through effective governance)—
promote value-adding initiatives within relationships.
We suggest that when logistics partnerships move beyond
transactional exchanges, partners share strategic information
with one another, thus generating relationship-specific per-
formance outcomes for each.  Consistent with the relational
perspective, flows of such information represent information/
knowledge exchanges between partners, and the resulting
access to partners’ strategic information represents comple-
mentary strategic resources.  Dyer and Singh’s (1998) rela-
tional perspective describes buyers growing “profits by
increasing their dependence on a smaller number of suppliers,
thereby increasing the incentives of suppliers to share knowl-
edge and make performance-enhancing investments” (p. 675). 
Accordingly, we examine the effect that buyer dependence on
a supplier has on the sharing of strategic information in the
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relationship between the two.  We further draw upon charac-
teristics of collaborative partnerships, as outlined in the rela-
tional perspective, to identify factors that enable strategic
information flows and that mitigate concerns about risks
associated with these exchanges.  First, buyer IT customiza-
tion represents complementary organizational resources and
capabilities as well as asset-specific technology investments
to exchange strategic information that is idiosyncratic to a
relationship.  Second, as Dyer and Singh note, trusting beliefs
in partners enable informal self-enforcing agreements that are
indicative of effective governance.  Finally, consistent with
the relational view of the firm, we employ a dyadic research
design in which data were collected from different account
managers of a single focal logistics vendor and from their
counterparts, namely account managers in different client
firms.
This paper proceeds with an elaboration of the types of
strategic information flows in supply chain relationships and
of the theoretical foundations for our model and each of our
hypotheses.  We follow this with a description of the research
methodology, the data analysis techniques, and the results. 
We then interpret the findings and their implications for
theory, practice, and future research.
Conceptualizing Strategic
Information Flows
Information sharing in supply chains has been examined by
scholars in information systems, operations management, and
marketing, among others.  Patnayakuni et al. (2006) provide
an extensive review of this literature.  Past work on the topic
focuses on (1) order-level information sharing in supply
chains (Cachon and Fisher 2000; Raghunathan 2001),
(2) capabilities of interorganizational IS (Rai et al. 2006;
Riggins et al. 1994), (3) asset ownership and contracting
arrangements that impact information sharing and process
capabilities (Clemons and Hitt 2004; Han et al. 2004), and (4)
specific types of performance consequences of information
sharing, such as its effects on product design, service quality,
and lead-time (Kotabe et al. 2003) as well as on transaction
costs (Wang and Seidmann 1995).
Reviewing this literature highlights two important lacunas. 
First, while past research stresses certain types of information
shared between partners, such as information about orders,
inventory, or customer demographics, most often prior work
does not deal with the sharing of marketing, operations, or
financial information.  Notably, we see a gap in the literature
in why strategic information exchange should occur in
buyer–supplier relationships.  Second, past studies do not
simultaneously investigate strategic information flows
between buyers and suppliers, which has hamstrung efforts to
understand conditions in which these flows occur and their
performance impacts.  Accordingly, there is a gap in the
literature on what conditions motivate and enable such
exchanges, what conditions mitigate risk concerns, and what
benefits each party realizes.
Given the focus of our investigation, we will first develop a
definition of strategic information.  Importantly, Uzzi and
Lancaster (2003) differentiate between private and public
information.  The latter is available in the public domain (e.g.,
audited financial statements, contractual stipulations, and
warrantees) and is verifiable through third parties.  Private
information, however, is not available in the public domain
and/or verifiable through third parties.  Thus, we conceptua-
lize strategic information as private in nature and not verified
by third parties.
To understand the content of exchange in strategic
information flows more fully, we draw on Seidmann and
Sundararajan (1997), who define the following classes of
private information that are shared among supply chain
partners:  (1) order, (2) operational, (3) strategic, and
(4) strategic/competitive.  For parsimony, we refer to the latter
three classes of information as strategic for the following
reasons:  (1) each is private and speaks of a higher level of
use than the order information exchanged in routine
transactions, and (2) these other three classes of information
provide managers with information that can be used in what
is frequently called strategic decision-making.  The opera-
tional class consists of production-related information about
resource conditions and plans, the strategic class focuses on
financial information related to revenue and profit-related
metrics, and the strategic/competitive class includes
marketing-related information for competitive positioning. 
Accordingly, we conceptualize all information falling into
these three classes as a form of strategic information that can
be exchanged in logistics relationships.  We now draw on the
relational view of the firm to examine conditions that promote
strategic information flows in logistics relationships.
A Relational Perspective of Strategic
Information Flows
The relational view of the firm (Dyer and Singh 1998)
advances research in marketing on how transactional
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exchange relationships can be developed into collaborative
partnerships and on the critical factors for such partnerships
(Dwyer et al. 1987; Morgan and Hunt 1994).  This theory’s
key premise is that relational rents and competitive advan-
tages can be generated through value-adding initiatives
enabled by interfirm resources and routines.  In contrast, the
traditional industry structure view of competitive advantage
sees rent generation as a by-product of adversarial bargaining
and highlights industry barriers to entry as mechanisms to
preserve rents (Porter 1980).  More recently, the resource-
based view recognized firm-level barriers to imitation,
acknowledging the power of scarce physical resources, know-
how, technology, finances, and intangibles (e.g., reputation)
in generating competitive advantages (Wernerfelt 1984).  The
underlying prescription of this view is that a firm needs to
control its critical resources, as it places itself at a
disadvantage when it must procure them from others.
In contrast to the industry structure and resource-based views,
Dyer and Singh advocate that pairs, or networks, of firms
realize gains from their connections, with dyadic- or network-
level barriers to imitation preserving these advantages.  The
distinctive characteristics of such “relational” partnerships
include (1) information/knowledge exchanges between
parties, (2) complementary strategic and organizational
resource or capability combinations, (3) relationship-specific
asset investments, and (4) effective relational governance. 
The mechanisms that subsequently preserve relationally
derived performance benefits include causal ambiguity, time
compression diseconomies, interorganizational asset inter-
connectedness, partner scarcity, resource indivisibility, and
institutional environments (Dyer and Singh 1998).
Drawing upon the work of Dwyer et al. (1987) and Morgan
and Hunt (1994) on collaborative interorganizational rela-
tionships as well as the relational view of the firm, we
conceptualize how logistics partnerships operate to generate
rents.  We suggest that flows of strategic information between
partners represent the exchange of complementary strategic
resources, that this exchange is characterized by time com-
pression diseconomies and is facilitated by asset intercon-
nectedness between partners, and that these complementary
strategic resources generate relational rents.  Buyer depen-
dence makes the supplier indispensable to the buyer (Richard
and Devinney 2005).  Additionally, when a buyer sources a
significant amount of its logistics requirements from a vendor,
it needs to be able to combine vendor resources and capa-
bilities effectively with its own.  Greater dependence thus
motivates the buyer to generate complementarities with the
vendor.  Hence, the need for such resource and capability
integration between partners promotes strategic information
flows.  Relationship-specific IT investments undertaken by
one or both parties through customization enhance the
integration of the supplier’s IT solutions and the buyer’s IT
infrastructure.  They also increase the dedicated IT resources
that are indivisible and cannot be redeployed outside of the
relationship.  In effect, these investments increase the inter-
connectedness of IT assets and enable the flow of strategic
information, which is idiosyncratic by nature.  Finally,
trusting beliefs between partners represent effective govern-
ance, as they reduce concerns about the misappropriation of
strategic information and promote their flow.
The relational view further focuses the unit of analysis on the
pair, or dyad, of firms.  This differs significantly from the
industry structure view, which focuses on the firm vis-à-vis
the entire industry (Dyer and Singh 1998).  The resource-
based view tends to focus on the internal resources of the firm
itself, only making comparisons with the industry to see
whether the firm holds comparative advantages.  Accordingly,
our investigation of interfirm relationships requires that the
relationship itself be specified as the focal unit of analysis
(Anderson et al. 1994; Chen and Paulraj 2004; Clemons and
Row 1993; Dyer and Singh 1998; Straub et al. 2004b). 
Practical difficulties inherent in dyadic research designs have
constrained researchers from developing nuanced theoretical
models at this level.  However, a more complete under-
standing of strategic information sharing requires theorizing
and testing with relevant constructs pertaining to both the
buyer and supplier in a single nomological network.
Research Model and Hypotheses
Figure 1 details our research model.  It posits relationships
between strategic information flows and relationship-specific
performance.  When considering conditions motivating
strategic information sharing between partners, our model
focuses on buyer dependence on the supplier.  Additionally,
buyer IT customization is one type of relationship-specific
asset investment enabling recurring interactions between the
two partners, and each party’s trusting beliefs in the other are
indicative of informal self-enforcing safeguards mitigating
potential risk concerns.
Strategic Information Flows and
Relationship-Specific Performance
While the sharing of order information is necessary for trans-
actional exchanges, the sharing of strategic information can
create additional value for partner firms.  Wal-Mart is a good
example of a firm that has generated rents and created value
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Figure 1.  Research Model:  Strategic Information Flows in Logistics Supply Chain Relationships
based on the mutual exchange of strategic information with its
suppliers (Yoffie and Mack 2005).  Such flows can be espe-
cially important in non-commodity settings, such as supply
chain logistics, in which services are rapidly evolving and
customers’ requirements are differentiated based on divergent
products, processes, segments, and channels.
Earlier we identified three types of strategic information in
supply chain relationships:  (1) operational, (2) strategic, and
(3) strategic/competitive.  Operational information relates to
the deployment of input resources to produce services, such
as information about inventory/capacity plans and production
schedules.  When shared, this information allows partners to
optimize input resources globally by streamlining buffers and
synchronizing resource allocations.  Strategic information
includes financial metrics on margin structures and costs. 
When shared, this information enables parties to collaborate
on ways to improve economic outcomes and to leverage
financial resources for both parties.  Finally, strategic/
competitive information affects firm competitive positioning
and planned actions in the market.  When shared, this infor-
mation enables partners to derive benefits by coordinating
sales and marketing initiatives with operational requirements.
Partners’ strategic information constitutes a complementary
resource endowment that can be leveraged to add value within
a given relationship.  Distinctive resources, such as strategic
information, possess the ability to generate additional rents for
partners that an individual owning firm could not alone (Dyer
and Singh 1998).  Indeed, Dyer and Singh posit that the more
“sensitive” the resource is, the greater the potential for returns
will be when sharing it with partners.  Moreover, strategic
complementary resources are often only available through
partners and not markets, thus sustaining the long-term
advantages (Oliver 1997).
To examine the gains derived by the buyer and the supplier
from the sharing of strategic information, we focus on each
party’s relationship-specific outcomes (Dyer and Singh
1998)—that is, the benefits readily and specifically attrib-
utable to relationship participation.  The IS success model
(DeLone and McLean 1992, 2003) specifies that IT impacts
should be examined at different levels:  individual, organiza-
tional, and intermediate points in between (e.g., the business
unit).  The key argument is that performance outcomes should
be examined at a level of specificity that is suitable for the
context, so as to mitigate the confounding effect of other
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variables.  In our context, relationship-specific performance
is the appropriate level of specificity, as it focuses on the
outcomes realized by each partner that are attributable to
participation in the relationship.  Broadly, these outcomes can
be classified as both tangible and intangible benefits.  Speci-
fically, the tangible benefits can include economic outcomes,
such as improved asset management, increased productivity,
and reduced operating costs.  Outcomes can also include
intangible aspects of a firm’s overall operational capabilities
that are more difficult to quantify (Brynjolfsson and Hitt
2000), such as improved production planning, enhanced
resource control, and increased flexibility.
Accordingly, we state four hypotheses related to downstream
relational outcomes of strategic information flows.  These
hypotheses posit that the buyer should realize Ricardian rents
from high levels of strategic information flows to and from
the supplier, while the supplier should see benefits from the
flow of strategic information to and from the buyer.
H1a: The greater buyer strategic information flows to the
supplier, the greater buyer relationship-specific
performance.
H1b: The greater buyer strategic information flows to the
supplier, the greater supplier relationship-specific
performance.
H2a: The greater supplier strategic information flows to
the buyer, the greater supplier relationship-specific
performance.
H2b: The greater supplier strategic information flows to
the buyer, the greater buyer relationship-specific
performance.
Buyer Dependence on Supplier and
Strategic Information Flows
Interorganizational relationships are based on the premise that
partners rely on each other to contribute certain resources that
they themselves do not possess in order to meet business
requirements (Dwyer et al. 1987).  Access to complementary
resources, therefore, is indispensable for successful interfirm
relationships and is a central tenet of the relational view of the
firm.  Buyer dependence on a focal supplier is a distinctive
element in our model, capturing the extent to which a supplier
services the business needs of the buyer over internal
resources or competitors.  For buyer firms, flows of strategic
information from the supplier should be derived as a by-
product of the level of buyer dependence on a given supplier. 
Moreover, dependence should motivate a buyer to share
strategic information with its supplier so as to be able to
coordinate actions and complement capabilities with them.
Dyer and Singh posit that increased buyer dependence on a
supplier serves to motivate the supplier to share more
information with the buyer and make additional relationship-
specific investments.  Such a view is consistent with Bakos
and Brynjolfsson’s (1993) contention that buyers pursuing
greater dependence on a few suppliers provide incentives for
the suppliers to make “investments in innovation, responsive-
ness, and information sharing” (p. 43).  Dyer and Singh also
note that greater volume and scope of transactions with
supply chain partners increases the “efficiency associated
with interfirm exchanges” (p. 664), as an absence of recurring
interactions limits partners’ ability to recognize complemen-
tary resources and opportunities for joint innovation and
improvement.
Based on the above reasoning, Hypotheses 3 and 4 posit that
higher levels of buyer dependence on a supplier promotes
higher levels of strategic information flows from buyer to
supplier and from supplier to buyer.
H3: The greater buyer dependence on a supplier, the more
buyer strategic information flows to the supplier.
H4: The greater buyer dependence on a supplier, the more
supplier strategic information flows to the buyer.
Buyer IT Customization and
Strategic Information Flows
Interorganizational relationships can generate relational rents
through organizational processes that enable strategic knowl-
edge to be transferred across firm boundaries (Dyer and Singh
1998).  Specifically, partners’ ability to exchange idiosyn-
cratic strategic information to generate relational rents
requires the implementation of customized interfirm routines
(Dyer and Singh 1998) and tightly integrated processes
(Payne and Frow 2005).  Such routines and processes, how-
ever, require relationship-specific asset investments (Joskow
1988).  Moreover, the specialization of assets is a requisite
condition for either direct or indirect rent generation (Amit
and Schoemaker 1993).  In general, IT assets can enable the
effectiveness of interfirm processes to capture, integrate,
access, and use information (Jayachandran et al. 2005).  In the
context of buyer relationships with a focal logistics supplier,
buyer IT customization constitutes a type of relationship-
specific asset investment.  Such an investment is directed to
support interorganizational collaboration and mutual adjust-
ment, which are infeasible in market exchanges, in contrast to
collaborative partnerships (Dyer and Singh 1998).
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IT resources used in logistics relationships vary in specificity
based on the degree to which they are generic, configured, or
customized.  On one end, generic solutions facilitate less
complex default information exchanges that are standardized
across partners and conceivably also include information that
is not private.  Configured solutions differentiate information
exchanges based on customer and context.  Modular services
and parameterized conditions, along with XML-based and
messaging standards, can be deployed to meet the differing
exchange requirements within each buyer–supplier rela-
tionship.  Finally, customized solutions incorporate highly
specialized built-to-order solutions for information exchanges,
such as customized routines for electronic data interchange
(EDI) or customized B2B interfaces to the partner’s enterprise
resource planning (ERP) systems.
Strategic information, such as information related to
resources, plans, and financial statuses, is highly proprietary,
unstructured, and unique to different buyer firms and
relational contexts.  Naturally, information that is shared in a
relationship needs to be structured and exchanged at different
levels of detail as well as in different combinations and
formats based on the unique characteristics of each
relationship.  Thus, while B2B solutions have evolved in their
flexibility, we argue that the very nature of strategic infor-
mation requires IT customization for its exchange between
partners.
Accordingly, our fifth and sixth hypotheses posit that higher
levels of buyer IT customization (i.e., relationship-specific
investments of time, money, and effort to customize inter-
organizational systems) enable greater levels of strategic
information flows from buyer to supplier and from supplier to
buyer.
H5: The greater buyer IT customization in the buyer–supplier
relationship, the more buyer strategic information flows
to the supplier.
H6: The greater buyer IT customization in the buyer–supplier
relationship, the more supplier strategic information
flows to the buyer.
Trusting Beliefs and Strategic
Information Flows
Value-creating initiatives are often achieved through the
sharing of “valuable, proprietary information” (Dyer and
Singh 1998), which only occurs in the presence of a high level
of confidence that such information will not be misused
(Dwyer et al. 1987).  The sharing of strategic information
does bring with it potential unintended consequences (Han et
al. 2004), in that the receiving partner might misuse
information to the detriment of the sharing partner (Clemons
and Hitt 2004).  Moreover, Dyer and Singh specifically note
the opportunities for parties to “free ride” on information
acquired from partners.  Accordingly, the relational view of
the firm posits that effective governance contributes to rent
generation through either lower transaction costs or incentives
promoting value-creating initiatives.  Notably, lower trans-
action costs, easily replicated by competitors, may not yield
a long-term competitive advantage.  Further, Dyer and Singh
specify that interfirm governance relies on either third-party
enforcement or self-enforcing mechanisms.  Given the con-
tracting and monitoring costs as well as the complexity
involved in third-party enforcement, self-enforcing mecha-
nisms constitute the more effective approach to achieving rent
generation (Dyer and Singh 1998).
To accomplish a high degree of cooperation, interfirm
alliances regularly employ both “formal” and “informal” self-
enforcement governance mechanisms (Gulati 1995).  Dyer
and Singh categorize formal safeguards as financial and
investment hostages (Williamson 1983), while informal
safeguards constitute the presence of mutual trust (Uzzi
1997).  With formal governance mechanisms, it might be
impossible to cover all contingencies necessary for engage-
ment in certain cooperative behaviors; however, parties that
have high trusting beliefs, or “trustworthiness,” in one another
reduce or even eliminate the necessity for covering all con-
tingencies (Dwyer et al. 1987).  While trust is defined as the
willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of another
irrespective of having the ability to monitor or control,
trusting beliefs are those characteristics that serve as the basis
for trust and engagement in trust-based actions (Mayer et al.
1995).  Absent formal control mechanisms, trust in partners
facilitates engagement in cooperative interorganizational
behaviors, which give rise to a greater degree of risk (Mayer
et al. 1995).  Ring and Van de Ven (1992) note that the risk
inherent in interfirm transactions necessitates that a firm
assess their trusting beliefs regarding the other party.  Trust
further establishes behavioral norms and expectations that
reduce the perceived risk of such opportunistic abuses
(Granovetter 1985).  Here, informal self-enforcing agreements
rely upon personal trust relations established among organi-
zational actors (Dyer and Singh 1998), which may be the most
effective and economical means to protect relational exchange
investments (Uzzi 1997).
Effective governance established through informal safeguards
via strong trusting beliefs is a prerequisite for fostering a
firm’s willingness to engage in collaborative initiatives, such
as strategic information sharing (Dyer and Singh 1998). 
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Hence, Hypotheses 7 and 8 posit that a higher level of trusting
beliefs in a party leads to increased strategic information
flows to that party.
H7: The greater buyer trusting beliefs in the supplier, the
more buyer strategic information flows to the supplier.
H8: The greater supplier trusting beliefs in the buyer, the
more supplier strategic information flows to the buyer.
Controls
Long-Term Orientation
Past research finds that longevity in a relationship is
associated with both trust (Anderson and Weitz 1989) and
dependence (Ganesan 1994), two constructs that appear in our
model.  Additionally, research suggests that longevity creates
“experience-based assets,” facilitating efficient communi-
cation and information exchange (Williamson 1985). 
Accordingly, we include long-term orientation as a control
variable for both strategic information flows and relationship-
specific performance.
Buyer Firm Size
Past research argues that compared to smaller firms, larger
organizations are less concerned about partner exploitation
(Doz 1987).  Larger firms also enjoy potential advantages in
exploiting the resource endowments of smaller partners and
in influencing their information-sharing behaviors (Hitt et al.
2002).  Accordingly, we include buyer firm size as a control
variable for both strategic information flows and relationship-
specific performance.
Research Design
Our study design employs an exploratory phase based on a
case study and a subsequent confirmatory phase based on a
survey.  During interviews in the exploratory phase, both
buyers and suppliers provided requisite qualitative data,
which we use to develop and validate the survey instrument
used in the confirmatory phase.
Measures 
The information obtained in the exploratory phase serves as
the basis for the development of measures for strategic infor-
mation flows, relationship-specific performance, buyer depen-
dence on supplier, and buyer IT customization.  We adapt
McKnight et al.’s (2002) multidimensional measure of
trusting beliefs for our context.  Further, we conceptualize
strategic information flows, relationship-specific performance,
and trusting beliefs for both sides of the relational dyad.  The
measures of each party are distinct, as noted by John and
Reve’s (1982) critique of construct measurement in dyadic
studies.  Accordingly, we model and independently capture
these variables with respect to the other partner by using dif-
ferent raters on each side of the dyad.  Although we employ
common scales, the construct definitions (i.e., buyer in sup-
plier and supplier in buyer) differ as buyer and supplier
constructs are conceptualized for different focal subjects
(Rossiter 2002).
Measures that are caused by a latent construct are reflective
(Edwards and Bagozzi 2000), while measures that determine
a construct are formative (MacCallum and Browne 1993).  To
determine if the measure for a construct/subconstruct is
reflective or formative, we apply the four rules developed by
Jarvis et al. (2003).  The first rule stipulates the direction of
causality to be from items to construct for formative measures
and from construct to items for reflective measures.  The
second rule maintains that items are interchangeable for
reflective measures but not for formative measures.  The third
rule states that covariance between measures is not necessary
for formative measures but is necessary for reflective
measures.  The fourth and final rule states that reflective
measures share common antecedents and consequences, a
condition not necessary for formative measures.2
To operationalize strategic information flows for both the
buyer and the supplier, we specify eight types of shared
strategic information as a formative measure.  We used the
exploratory phase to determine the types of strategic infor-
mation for the relationship context under examination, namely
a focal logistics vendor and its client.  We further validated
these items through discussions with account managers at the
vendor firm and at two of its client firms.  Each of the
individuals at the vendor and the client firms had five years or
more of tenure in their positions.  The client firms used the
focal vendor and at least one other competitor. Each of these
2When there is theoretical ambiguity about the nature of a measure for a
construct, vanishing tetrad analysis can be used to statistically inform if a
construct’s indicators are reflective or formative.  For a construct with four
indicators, g, h, i, and j, a tetrad equals the difference between the product of
a pair of covariances and the product of another pair of variances, τghij = σghσij – σgi σhj (Bollen and Ting 2000).  A simultaneous test of the nonredundant
tetrads that cannot reject the null hypothesis of a vanishing tetrad is
suggestive of reflective indicators, while a test that can reject the null
hypotheses is suggestive of formative indicators (Bollen and Ting 2000).
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types represents strategic information sharing above and
beyond order-related information that is required for
transactional exchanges (Seidmann and Sundararajan 1997). 
Appendix A details the specific information types for the
buyer and the supplier that emerged in the exploratory phase.
Similarly, we use a six-item formative measure to assess
relationship-specific performance for both the buyer and
supplier.  Again, we drew upon the exploratory phase to
inform the development of applicable performance items,
which we subsequently validated through discussions with the
vendor and its clients.  These performance outcomes include
tangible economic outcomes (e.g., improved asset manage-
ment, increased productivity, and reduced operating costs)
and intangible outcomes that are hard to quantify (e.g.,
improved capacity planning, improved resource control, and
increased resource flexibility).  Applying the criteria iden-
tified by Jarvis et al., we model the measures for strategic
information flows and relationship-specific performance
constructs as formative.3
We assess buyer dependence on supplier by using a single-
item, ten-level interval scale on the percentage of the buyer’s
logistics needs served by the vendor.  Single-item measures
are justified when there are restrictions on instrument length
(Straub et al. 2004a), when the addition of multiple items
introduces “wasteful redundancy” (Rossiter 2002) in the
presence of a “concrete” measure (Bergkvist and Rossiter
2007), and when constructs are unambiguous and focused
(Sackett and Larson 1990).  All of these conditions are true
for our measurement of buyer dependence, which led us to opt
for a single-item measure.
We use three reflective items to measure buyer IT customi-
zation.  Two of these items assess the extent to which a client
employs generic, configured, or customized applications in
supporting exchanges with its vendor.  The third item
measures client customization along a ten-level interval scale
that captures the percentage of customized applications used
in the relationship.
Finally, Mayer et al. (1995) identify three trusting beliefs that
appear frequently in the organizational literature, namely
ability, benevolence, and integrity.  Ability comprises
domain-specific skills, competencies, and/or characteristics;
benevolence captures the extent to which partners are
believed to act in a positive manner; and finally, integrity
encompasses partners’ perceived adherence to generally
accepted principles.  To assess the trusting beliefs a buyer and
supplier have in one another, we use these three first-order
subconstructs, which in turn determine the second-order
construct, trusting beliefs.4  The measures for the subcon-
structs meet the four conditions noted for reflective measures. 
Conversely, the subconstructs of ability, benevolence, and
integrity used to measure trusting beliefs meet the four
conditions noted for formative measures.  Serva et al. (2005)
examine rival conceptualizations of trusting beliefs as a single
construct; three independent constructs; and a second-order,
multidimensional construct with their analysis supporting a
multidimensional, second-order conceptualization.  In their
detailed evaluation of misspecification of formative and
reflective measures in the IS literature, Petter et al. (2007)
also validate this specification of these trusting beliefs
measures.  Accordingly, we operationalize the three first-
order subconstruct measures of ability, benevolence, and
integrity as reflective and the second-order construct measures
of trusting beliefs as formative.
Interfirm Dyads as Unit of Analysis
While prior research advocates for the importance of dyadic
research designs to investigate phenomena associated with
interfirm relationships (Anderson et al. 1994; Clemons and
Row 1993; Dyer 1996; Straub et al. 2004b), practical diffi-
culties often lead to collection of data from only one side of
the relationship (Malhotra et al. 2005).  Focusing on the
relationship itself, we collect data from both partners,
adopting a “focal supplier” collection strategy as was also
employed by Dyer (1996).  We selected a Global 500 logistics
firm headquartered in the southeastern United States as the
vendor site.  The firm provides supply chain services to
clients in a broad spectrum of industries.  Traditionally,
logistics vendors have seen their core competency as accurate
and timely delivery of goods.  Their offerings have expanded
to include an increasing number of strategic, IT-related supply
chain solutions.  In fact, the focal vendor has developed an
electronic commerce market segment, which serves as the
focus of the current study.  The focal vendor has invested not
only to develop these IT-enabled supply chain solutions but
also to create an infrastructure of skilled high-tech account
managers to service client firms.  The vendor’s account
3Our analysis of the nonredundant tetrads (Bollen and Ting 2000) for the
strategic information flows, relationship-specific performance, and first-order
trusting beliefs construct indicators supports a formative specification of
each.
4Latent variables with no indicators can be classified as phantom variables
or as second-order formative constructs. Phantom variables were devised as
a methodological mechanism to impose constraints on parameter estimates
(Rindskopf 1984). Conversely, second-order formative constructs, unlike
phantom variables, are meaningful theoretical constructs (MacCallum and
Browne 1993). In our case, trusting beliefs is a well established theoretical
construct (Mayer et al. 1995; McKnight et al. 2002), which is formed by the
three dimensions of ability, benevolence, and integrity (Petter et al. 2007;
Serva et al. 2005).
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managers and its dedicated contacts within client firms are
responsible for managing the interfirm relationship.  The
nature of the services provided by the vendor and the structure
of its relationship management made the setting well suited
for our purposes.
Data Collection
The client and vendor account managers were the most
appropriate informants, as they occupy roles that make them
knowledgeable about study constructs (Campbell 1955). 
They typically play a critical role in relationship management
and oversee the coordination of information sharing and the
customization of workflows (Homburg et al. 2002).  The use
of client and vendor account managers who are best equipped
to provide the information also enables us to minimize
informant bias (Huber and Power 1980).  Accordingly, our
sampling frame includes 183 vendor account managers who
oversee one or more clients, each of varying size and com-
plexity.  As these account managers oversee multiple clients,
one relationship was randomly selected for each of them with
respect to the client firm’s size, tenure, profitability, or the
nature of its interactions.  The primary contacts at the 183
different buyer organizations received the client version of the
survey instrument from a senior executive at the vendor firm. 
The vendor account managers also received the survey from
the same senior executive, and those who did not initially
respond to the survey received follow-up reminders to ensure
that vendor responses were obtained for all responding
clients.
Table 1 provides a profile of the respondents.  Client firm
respondents represented a cross-section of major industries
and were primarily from higher functional levels (e.g.,
director and vice president level), with the majority from
operational and logistics functions.  In total, 132 of the 183
account managers from the vendor side completed the survey
for a response rate of 72 percent.  On the buyer side, 91 of the
183 account managers responded for a response rate of 49
percent.  Pooling both buyer and supplier responses yields a
61 percent overall rate, with 223 out of a potential 366
respondents completing the survey.  The final matching of
client and vendor respondents resulted in 182 completed
buyer and supplier surveys, or 91 usable dyadic surveys. 
Previous studies that have employed a similar dyadic data
collection strategy have achieved an average response rate of
approximately 58 percent (Dyer 1996; Fein and Anderson
1997; Johnson et al. 1996).5  Hence, our study achieved not
only a reasonably high number of usable matched responses
but also a response rate that is consistent with prior dyadic
interfirm research.
Assessment of Survey Bias
Nonresponse Bias
The vendor’s senior management sponsors for this project
would not allow us to contact client firms personally, thus
preventing a robust assessment of nonresponse bias.  Never-
theless, tests indicate that nonresponse bias is not likely an
issue with our data.  We compare construct means between
the early and late waves of the survey responses (Armstrong
and Overton 1977) and detect no differences across these
waves regarding the clients’ primary industry, regional loca-
tion, and number of employees.  Moreover, we detect no
differences across these waves on the following respondent
characteristics:  gender; years with the organization; and years
of work experience, IT experience, and business relationship
management experience (see analyses of variance (ANOVA)
results in Appendix B).  We also find no differences with
respect to the 91 responding and 92 nonresponding client
firms on relationship longevity, primary industry, and regional
location.  In addition, we find no differences between the 132
responding and 51 nonresponding vendor representatives in
terms of years with the organization, gender, and each
representative’s direct supervisor.  Finally, we find no varia-
tion between the 41 unmatched responding vendor represen-
tatives and the 91 matched responding vendor representatives
in terms of the client’s primary industry, regional location,
years with the organization, gender, and their years of overall
work, IT, and business relationship management experience
(see Appendix B).  Based on the collective evidence, we infer
that nonresponse bias is not an issue.
Common Method Bias
Steps to safeguard against common method bias include the
use of different types of measures across constructs and
different scale types for key construct measures (Podsakoff et
al. 2003).  Specifically, we utilize formative measures for
strategic information flows, relationship-specific performance,
and trusting beliefs and employ reflective measures for buyer
IT customization.  In addition to Likert scales, we use interval
scales for buyer dependence on supplier and IT customiza-
5Dyer’s survey of suppliers in the automobile manufacturing industry, for
example, yielded 83 usable pairs with a 61 percent response rate for the
suppliers and 77 percent for manufacturers.  In examining territory and brand
choices in manufacturer–distributor relationships, Fein and Anderson
obtained 362 usable pairs, with a reported overall response rate of 72 percent.
Finally, in studying international cooperative alliances, Johnson et al. realized
a 44 percent overall response rate with 98 matched pairs.
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Table 1.  Respondent Characteristics
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tion.  For the control variables, we use an interval scale to
measure the client’s firm size and a ratio scale to measure the
duration of the relationship in years, which is our proxy for
the long-term orientation of the relationship.  Our data for
relationship duration were obtained from the vendor’s
archival records.  Our application of the Harmon one-factor
test prescribed by Podsakoff and Organ (1986) results in
seven extracted factors from the survey data.  No single factor
accounts for the bulk of the covariance, leading to the
conclusion that common method bias is not an issue.
Analysis and Results
The confirmatory phase of our study includes measurement
validation and hypothesis testing.  The model includes four
constructs with formative measures, one construct with a
reflective measure, two second-order constructs with forma-
tive measures, and one construct with a single-item measure. 
We employ structural equation modeling (SEM), which
allows for modeling multiple interdependent relationships and
second-order constructs (Anderson and Gerbing 1988).  We
use partial least squares (PLS), a components-based SEM, as
it has no distributional assumptions and is flexible to the
inclusion of formative and reflective measures in a model
(Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001).  Additionally, with
covariance-based SEM, formative measures can give rise to
problems with identification, or ensuring that a solution exists
for each parameter within the structural model (Rigdon 1995). 
To achieve identification may require (1) elimination of
structural paths, (2) restriction of construct error terms to zero,
or (3) re-specification of the structural model (MacCallum
and Browne 1993).  In contrast, components-based SEM does
not face the statistical identification challenges inherent in
covariance-based approaches to formative modeling (Petter et
al. 2007).  Finally, components-based SEM maximizes the
explained variance of endogenous variables in the structural
model (Gefen et al. 2000; Chin 1998), which enables us to
understand how much variance is explained in the constructs
for strategic information flows and in the constructs for
relationship-specific performance.
Assessment of Measurement Model
Our reflective measures exhibit good internal consistency and
exceed the suggested .7 threshold for Cronbach’s alpha
(Nunnally and Bernstein 1994), with values of .87 for buyer
IT customization; .96, .95, and .91 for each of the three
dimensions of buyer trusting beliefs in the supplier; and .89,
.92, and .96 for supplier trusting beliefs in the buyer.  To
evaluate the discriminant validity of the reflective measures,
we first conduct an exploratory factor analysis for items
related to trusting beliefs.  Our results suggest that integrity,
benevolence, and competence are distinct dimensions of
trusting beliefs (see Appendix C).  One supplier integrity item
shows a slight cross-loading with supplier benevolence;
however, its loading on the integrity dimension clearly
exceeds its cross-loading on the benevolence dimension.  We
also compare inter-construct correlations with the average
variance extracted (AVE), or the percentage of overall
variance in the indicators captured by the latent construct
(Hair et al. 1998).  This comparison supports discriminant
validity with the square root of the AVE for each measure
exceeding correlations between the measure and other
measures (see Table 2).
In contrast to reflective measures, formative measures do not
need to exhibit internal consistency or reliability (Chin 1998;
Gefen et al. 2000; Petter et al. 2007).  In fact, multi-
collinearity among formative indicators can result in non-
significant items (Diamantopoulos 2006), as multiple
indicators may identify the same aspect of a construct (Petter
et al. 2007).  The variance inflation factor (VIF) is a useful
statistic to assess such problems, with values below 3.3
indicative of the absence of multicollinearity (Diaman-
topoulos and Siguaw 2006).  For our formative measures, we
find the VIF values to be 2.0 and 1.6 for buyer trusting beliefs
in the supplier and supplier trusting beliefs in the buyer, 1.3
and 2.2 for strategic information flows for the buyer and the
supplier, and 1.1 and 1.6 for relationship-specific performance
for the buyer and the supplier.
Figure 2 shows the weights of formative indicators associated
with the constructs for trusting beliefs (2a), strategic infor-
mation flows (2b), and relationship-specific performance (2c)
for the buyer and the supplier.  With components-based SEM,
weights are estimated based on the overall model.  They pro-
vide insight into the meaningfulness of the set of formative
indicators and their relative importance in the context of the
nomology.  When n orthogonal formative indicators are
specified, the ceiling on their average weight is .  This( / )1 n
average standardized weight is achieved when formative
indicators explain all of the variance in a construct.  Given
three formative indicators for trusting beliefs, the theoretical
maximum average weight of these indicators is .58. 
Similarly, we measure strategic information flows and
relationship-specific performance outcomes using eight and
six formative indicators; hence the theoretical maximum for
each of their average weights is .35 and .41, respectively.  The
results show that the observed average weights for the
formative indicators associated with each construct are
favorable:  .40 for buyer trusting beliefs in supplier, .36 for
supplier trusting beliefs in buyer, .23 for strategic information
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Table 2.  Matrix of Intercorrelations and Square Roots of AVEs*
Theoretical Variables
Measure
Type 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Buyer Strategic Information Flows to Supplier (1) Formative .87
Supplier Strategic Information Flows to Buyer (2) Formative .19 .91
Buyer Relationship-Specific Performance (3) Formative .20 .19 .94
Supplier Relationship-Specific Performance (4) Formative .31 .23 -.03 .94
Buyer Dependence on Supplier (5) Single Item .63 .32 .24 .20 1.00
Buyer IT Customization Reflective .55 .29 .12 .21 .41 .89
Buyer Trusting Beliefs in Supplier (7) Formative .40 .36 .06 .38 .42 .14 .88
Supplier Trusting Beliefs in Buyer (8) Formative .59 .40 .02 .25 .36 .29 .40 .92
Controls
Long-Term Orientation (9) Single Item .04 .04 .04 -.04 .10 -.12 .22 -.02 1.00
Buyer Firm Size (10) Single Item .05 .05 .06 -.11 -.05 .17 .02 .66 .14 1.00
*Square Root of AVEs reported along diagonal in bold.
flows from buyer, .20 for strategic information flows from
supplier, .26 for buyer relationship-specific outcomes, and .29
for supplier relationship-specific performance outcomes. 
These average weights are evidence of the importance of each
of the formative indicators.
We employ a different procedure to assess the discriminant
validity of the formative measures than the AVE analysis used
for reflective measures.  The AVE presumes that measures
will converge, a condition that is not necessary for the
formative measures (Jarvis et al. 2003).  Hence, we examine
item-to-item and item-to-construct correlations for these
constructs.  Using PLS item weights for individual formative
indicators, we compute composite construct scores.  These
scores, in turn, serve as the basis for calculating item-to-item
and item-to-construct correlations and evaluating discriminant
validity (Ravichandran and Rai 2000).  We find intra-
construct item correlations to be greater than inter-construct
item correlations.  Additionally, the items exhibit stronger
correlations with their composite construct scores than with
the composite scores of other constructs.  Finally, as
suggested by Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer (2001), the
formative items for constructs should correlate with “a global
item that summarizes the essence of the construct” (p. 272). 
High correlations with a global item and low correlations with
other constructs provide additional evidence of discriminant
validity.  Cumulatively, these results suggest that the instru-
ment has acceptable measurement properties.
Hypothesis Testing
Figure 3 shows the PLS structural model results.  The model
accounts for 50 percent of the variance in buyer strategic
information flows to the supplier and for 30 percent of the
variance in supplier strategic information flows to the buyer. 
Additionally, it accounts for 39 percent of the variance in
buyer relationship-specific performance and for 34 percent of
the variance in supplier relationship-specific performance.
In terms of the structural paths, the results support H1 and H2. 
Strategic information flows positively and significantly
impact relationship-specific performance for both the buyer
and supplier.  While the results support H3 (buyer dependence
on supplier positively impacts buyer strategic information
flows to the supplier), they do not support H4 (there was no
significant direct effect detected for buyer dependence on
supplier strategic information flows to the buyer).  Further,
the results support H5 and H6, as the positive relationships
between buyer IT customization and both parties’ strategic
information flows are significant.  Finally, supporting H7 and 
H8, the results show significant direct effects for both buyer
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a.  Trusting Beliefs
b.  Strategic Information Flows
c.  Relationship-Specific Performance
*Significant at .05 level; **Significant at .01 level; ***Significant at .001 level
Figure 2.  Formative Indicator Weights
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Path Coefficients











Buyer Strategic Information Flows to Supplier (BSIFS)
Supplier Strategic Information Flows to Buyer (SSIFB)
Buyer Relationship-Specific Performance (BRSP)
Supplier Relationship-Specific Performance (SRSP)
*Significant at .05 level; **Significant at .01 level; ***Significant at .001 level
Figure 3.  Partial Least Squares Results
trusting beliefs in the supplier and supplier trusting beliefs in
the buyer on the corresponding strategic information flows
between parties.6
Appendix D details the results for the control-variables-only
model, the theoretical-variables-only model, and the full
model.  With respect to the control variables, neither long-
term orientation nor buyer size has a significant influence on
the mediating or dependent variables.  We speculate that long-
term orientation does not directly influence strategic infor-
mation sharing or relationship-specific performance.  Rather,
long-term orientation influences other relational properties,
such as trusting beliefs and buyer IT customization, which
influence strategic information flows and other forms of
cooperative behavior that are proximate determinants of
relationship-specific performance outcomes.7  Similarly,
6 We evaluate the statistical power or the probability that tests correctly reject
the null hypothesis (Baroudi and Orlikowski 1989; Marcoulides and
Saunders 2006).  We find power values, for α = .01, in excess of the .80
recommended threshold (Cohen 1992) for both the theoretical and full
models (see Appendix D).
7A post hoc analysis suggests that long-term orientation is an antecedent to
buyer trust in the supplier.
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Table 3.  Pseudo F Test for Effect Size of Theoretical Variables
Construct ΔR² f ² F-statistic Effect Size
Buyer Strategic Information Flows .46 .9200 78.200* Large
Supplier Strategic Information Flows .25 .3571 30.357* Large
Buyer Relationship-Specific Performance .35 .5738 48.770* Large
Supplier Relationship-Specific Performance .28 .4242 36.061* Large
*Significant at .001 level.
size of the organization (i.e., relative differences in size or
bargaining power) may again impact strategic information
sharing or relationship-specific performance only through
their influence on other relational properties that serve as
proximate antecedents to them.
To test the additional contribution of the theoretical variables
when added to the control-variables-only model, we examine
the incremental changes in R2.  We measure the effect size
and significance of the change in variance explained between
models using an f 2 statistic, which we calculate by dividing
(R2full model – R2control variables) by (1 – R2full model) (Chin et al. 2003). 
A small effect size is .02, medium approaches .15, and large
approaches .35 (Cohen 1992).  Subsequently, we calculate a
pseudo F-statistic with (k-c, N-k-c) degrees of freedom, where
N is the sample size (91), k is the number of parameters
estimated for the full model, and c is the number of
parameters estimated for the control-variables-only model
(Cohen 1988).  The addition of the theoretical variables adds
significantly to explaining the variance in the strategic infor-
mation flows and the relationship-specific performance
constructs (see Table 3).
Our sample size of 91 matched dyads raises the question
about potential bias in parameter estimates due to the con-
sistency at large property.  We employ ordinary least squares
(OLS) path analysis (Asher 1983) to evaluate if the results are
similar to the PLS analysis.  We specify four OLS regression
models to test the direct and indirect effects of the antecedent
variables and employ composite scores of items for the first-
order constructs and composite scores of the first-order
constructs for the second-order constructs.  We observe that
the OLS path analysis results are consistent with the PLS
results.  We should note that OLS was not chosen as our
primary analysis tool for three reasons:  (1) it assumes
independent error terms across equations (Pedhazur 1997),
(2) it does not make a distinction between formative and
reflective measures, and (3) it uses a composite score instead
of multi-item measures for constructs.
Discussion
We draw upon the relational view of the firm and employ a
dyadic research design to investigate the performance
consequences and antecedents of strategic information flows
between buyers and suppliers in collaborative relationships. 
We demonstrate that buyers and suppliers realize performance
benefits through the flow of strategic information from one
party to the other.  For both the buyer and the supplier, this
sharing results in financial gains from improved asset
management, lowered operating costs, and increased produc-
tivity as well as in operational capability gains from improved
planning, increased resource control, and enhanced process
flexibility.  Grounded in game theory, the prisoner’s dilemma
posits that sharing or withholding information leads to
distinctly different outcomes, with cooperation in sharing
information potentially maximizing benefits to both parties,
while withholding information has the potential to punish one
or the other party or both (Deutsch 1958; Lave 1962).  In
moving past transactional exchanges, collaborative partner-
ships require firms to engage in cooperative initiatives in
pursuit of rent generation (Morgan and Hunt 1994).  Our
results suggest that given certain conditions, there is
significant value to be garnered by each party through co-
operatively sharing strategic information and complementing
their strategic information with that of their partner.
While our model accounts for 30 percent of the explained
variance in buyer relationship-specific performance and for 39
percent in supplier relationship-specific performance, the
remaining unexplained variance merits additional consi-
deration.  To examine the influence of strategic information
flows further, we conduct a post hoc analysis of the inter-
action effects that buyer strategic information flows to
supplier and supplier strategic information flows to buyer
have on the relationship-specific performance of each partner. 
As reported in Table 4, we observe a .06 change in the
variance explained for buyer relationship-specific perform-
ance for a medium effect size and a .14 change in the variance
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Table 4.  PLS Results of Post Hoc Information Flows Interaction Effects






BFIS SSIFB BRSO SRSO BSIFS SSIFB BRSP SRSP
Theoretical Variables
BSIFS .31*** .29** .28*** .25**
SSIFB .40*** .49*** .36*** .44***
BSIFS × SSIFB .28** .43***
Buyer Dependence on Supplier .26** -.11 .32*** .05
Buyer IT Customization .36*** .36*** .40*** .38***
Buyer Trusting Beliefs in Supplier .40*** .36***
Supplier Trusting Beliefs in Buyer .26** .24*
Controls
Long-Term Relationship Orientation .00 -.08 .11 -.10 .09 -.08 .12 -.07
Buyer Firm Size -.10 .12 -.06 .08 -.10 .12 -.10 .05
R² .50 .30 .39 .34 .50 .30 .45 .48
Change in R² .06 .14
Cohen’s f ² .11 .27
F-statistic 7.589 22.885
Effect Size Medium Large
Buyer Strategic Information Flows to Supplier (BFIS)
Supplier Strategic Information Flows to Buyer (SSIFB)
Buyer Relationship-Specific Performance (BRSP)
Supplier Relationship-Specific Performance (SRSP)
*Significant at .05 level; **Significant at .01 level; ***Significant at .001 level
explained for supplier relationship-specific performance for
a large effect size.  Thus, the inclusion of this interaction term
results in substantial increases in the variance explained for
both buyer and supplier outcomes.  Interestingly, the buyers
within our initial analysis (i.e., without the interaction) see
higher relationship-specific performance gains than the
supplier (see item mean values in Appendix A).  More
dramatic increases in the variance explained for suppliers
because of the interaction term may reflect the additional
benefits that the vendor realizes by aggregating information
that is shared by their client firms.
Our results also suggest that buyers who have a greater
dependence on the supplier are more likely to share strategic
information with them, as they have a greater motivation to
achieve synergy with the vendor’s resources and capabilities. 
While the industry structure view sees buyers maximizing
their bargaining power through increased numbers of
suppliers and only limited dependence on any one supplier
(Porter 1980), the relational view posits that buyers profit
from increased concentration of sourcing with a supplier
(Dyer and Singh 1998).  However, within our study this
sourcing dependence does not promote the sharing of strategic
information by the supplier.  A buyer who sources a high
volume and large scope of services from a supplier is
motivated to share strategic resources with them to achieve
complementarities (Dyer and Singh 1998).  Hence, we see
increases in buyer flows of strategic information to the
supplier with increases in buyer dependence.  However, our
results suggest that increases in buyer dependence do not
translate into increases in supplier’s motivation to reciprocate
with the sharing of its strategic information.  As shown in
Appendix A, the higher mean values for strategic information
flows from supplier to buyer, rather than from buyer to sup-
plier, suggest that the logistics industry may now have
evolved to a point where buyers have baseline expectations
for information sharing from suppliers.
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Additionally, in a different relational context (e.g., manu-
facturer–distributor alliance), dependence may operate in a
manner similar to trusting beliefs, with each party’s
dependence on the other shaping their exchange behaviors. 
We do not examine the impact of supplier dependence on
strategic information sharing, as Dyer and Singh posit buyer
dependence on the supplier motivates both parties to engage
in value-creating initiatives.  Further, our research design uses
one focal vendor firm, which is one of the largest in the
logistics industry and has limited dependence on any single
customer, thus precluding an examination of supplier
dependence.  It will be instructive to examine both buyer
dependence and supplier dependence in future research.
Our results support the argument that asset-specific invest-
ments enhance the richness of interfirm collaboration (Joskow
1988).  This finding is also consistent with Dyer and Singh’s
contention that organizational complementary resources and
capabilities serve to enable value creation through strategic
complementary interfirm resource combinations.  Specifi-
cally, our results suggest that IT customization (an organiza-
tional complement) enables flows of strategic information (a
strategic complement) between buyer and supplier.  This
information is, by nature, idiosyncratic to different relation-
ships and cannot be shared without the customization of
systems.  Dyer and Singh further note potential cumulative, or
“snowball,” effects resulting from the interconnectedness of
a given relationship-specific investment with other invest-
ments.  We speculate that buyer IT customization efforts are
“bundled” with earlier supplier investments in developing IT
services, configured IS, and related technological capabilities
(Russell 2002).  These supplier investments effectively make
subsequent relationship-specific buyer investments “econom-
ically viable” (Dyer and Singh 1998).
Finally, trusting beliefs in relational partners increases
strategic information flows to the respective partner, which
supports Dyer and Singh’s proposition that effective
governance fosters a willingness to engage in cooperative
initiatives.  We find that a buyer and supplier who perceive
that their partner acts with benevolence and integrity, in
addition to being competent, are more likely to share strategic
information.  In our conceptualization, we differentiate
between order-related information, which must be shared in
transactional exchanges, and strategic information, which has
great potential to generate additional rents but also has risks
of misappropriation.  The sharing of private, strategic infor-
mation can be dangerous for firms, as it potentially leads to
unintended consequences (Han et al. 2004).  Our results
provide insights into how trusting beliefs create the necessary
environment in which partners move past concerns of
opportunism.
We also observe a noteworthy pattern related to trusting
beliefs and the sharing of strategic information.  The construct
mean values (see Appendix A) show that even though the
buyer trusts the vendor more than the vendor trusts the buyer,
it is the vendor who shares far more strategic information with
the buyer.  Moreover, trusting beliefs have a greater impact on
promoting strategic information flows from buyer to supplier
than from supplier to buyer (see path coefficients in Figure 3
or Appendix D). Given the structure of the logistics market,
long-standing business practices within the industry may find
dominant suppliers sharing a significant amount of informa-
tion related to operations, finances, and marketing with their
customers.  However, buyer sharing of such information may
be shaped much more by trust-related considerations in the
relationship.
Contributions
Digitally enabled collaborative relationships are an alternative
to conventional arms-length relationships for supply chain
services.  Such partnerships go beyond the sharing of order-
related information, which facilitates transactional exchanges,
to share strategic information, which has the potential to
generate additional rents for partners.  Thus, an understanding
of the performance potential and the essential enablers and
safeguards of strategic information flows will aid firms in
making meaningful choices between transactional exchanges
and collaborative partnerships and to focus relationship
management initiatives.
Our work constitutes one of the first efforts within the IS
community to draw upon the relational view to examine the
role of information systems in interorganizational relation-
ships and to evaluate how strategic information flows yield
advantages for participants.  Our theorizing draws on the
characteristics of collaborative partnerships as outlined by
Dyer and Singh, and our results provide strong support for the
core tenets of the relational view in the context of logistics
partnerships.  The characteristics of collaborative partnerships
as detailed within the relational view suggest new perspec-
tives for understanding interfirm phenomenon beyond the
traditional industry structure and resource-based views.
We also collect dyadic data and, by so doing, add to the thin
pool of such research in the IS literature (Clemons and Row
1993; Kirsch et al. 2002; Klein et al. 2007; Malhotra et al.
2007; Straub et al. 2004b).  Additionally, our approach to
theorizing and the research design should prove to be a
beneficial template to researchers investigating other
phenomenon spanning organizational boundaries.  Many past
IS studies on interorganizational relationships have captured
752 MIS Quarterly Vol. 33 No. 4/December 2009
Klein & Rai/Strategic Information Flows
the perspectives of both parties in their theoretical models but
have collected data about the relationship from one firm’s
perspective (e.g., Gosain et al. 2004; Grover et al. 2003;
Malhotra et al. 2005, 2007; Rai et al. 2006).  While Klein et
al. (2007) used a dyadic research design, they conceptualized
constructs and operationalized measures in terms of total
magnitude and symmetry across parties in a relationship. 
Here, consistent with the relational view, our model
incorporates constructs to capture the beliefs, behaviors, and
outcomes of both parties in a relationship, and our empirical
study uses a dyadic design to test this model.
Practical Implications
From a practical perspective, our results yield actionable
guidelines for the management of logistics relationships. 
First, account managers in buyer and supplier firms should
focus on strategic information that promotes rent generation
through sharing with partners.  Specifically, the evidence
suggests that going beyond the sharing of order-only infor-
mation can result in benefits for both parties.  The exchange
of information related to operations, including inventory
levels and market actions (e.g., new product launches and
market entry initiatives), can enable buyers and suppliers of
logistics solutions to leverage their complementary resources
and capabilities.  Accordingly, sharing such strategic infor-
mation can result in additional benefits for both parties,
namely lower obsolescence or spoilage rates for buyers and
more efficient asset utilization for suppliers.
Second, managers can track and share relationship-specific
measures related to financial outcomes, such as cost and
margin structures, at the relationship level.  The integration of
buyer ERP applications with vendor systems can facilitate
access to such measures.  The sharing of such measures will
enable buyers and suppliers to evaluate collaboratively as to
how the flows of strategic information influence inventory
turn rates and operational efficiencies and how these measures
relate to financial outcomes.
Third, customization of IT establishes the digital capability
for the flows of strategic information that are idiosyncratic to
a given relationship.  Consider how many FedEx clients use
a standardized online tracking application to find out
transaction-related information, such as their package delivery
status (Russell 2002).  However, leading logistics vendors,
including FedEx, have developed customized solutions, or
service-oriented architectures, to encapsulate IT services and
configure solutions in an effort to meet the differentiated
collaboration needs of their customers (Russell 2002).  Such
IT solutions can enable the flows of more strategic informa-
tion within these partnerships.
Fourth, each partner firm must cultivate trust in the other
through recurring interactions to mitigate concerns about the
risks of opportunism.  While firms must demonstrate their
functional and technical capabilities to their partners, they
must also recognize that conveying concern for partner firms
and adherence to high ethical standards are critical to
fostering trusting beliefs.  Repeated engagements between
buyer and supplier can reinforce beliefs about ability,
benevolence, and integrity, ultimately mitigating concerns
about the risks of sharing strategic information.  Hence,
informal, self-enforcing mechanisms are a viable alternative
to third-party enforcement when pursuing risky information
sharing initiatives.
Limitations and Future Research
Our focus on a single logistics vendor firm and its clients is a
limitation as both the buyer dependence on supplier and the
buyer IT customization constructs are assessed from only the
buyer side of the relationship.  Future research should repli-
cate this study with other vendors and their clients, while also
examining other sourced services and measuring constructs
from the perspective of the firms that participate in the
relationship.  Moreover, despite the inherent difficulties in
devising and implementing strategies to collect data from both
parties to a relationship, future work should attempt data
collection from both suppliers and buyers within the same
study.
In examining organizational phenomenon, researchers
frequently seek response data from informants within firms. 
The use of multiple informants within the same organization
improves both the quality of response data and the validity of
the findings (Van Bruggen et al. 2002).  Not seeking out
multiple informants from each side constitutes another
limitation of our work.  Future efforts should attempt to obtain
access to multiple informants from each responding
organization.
While we focus on IT assets and resources, subsequent
research should investigate other resources and capabilities as
well as their complementarities facilitating interorganiza-
tional value creation.  The relational perspective (Dyer and
Singh 1998) is a viable, rich explanation of interfirm rela-
tionships, and finding evidence in other contexts supporting
the relational view, as well as evidence for or against our
proposed model, is important for scientific verification.  Here
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again, we see our work as a first step, as elements of the
relational view outlined by Dyer and Singh suggest new
perspectives for informing academic inquiry into a broad
range of interorganizational phenomenon.
Researchers should also evaluate other theoretical perspec-
tives on the evolution and outcomes in interorganizational
relationships.  For instance, work within marketing proposes
quasi-Darwinian selection (Eyuboglu and Buja 2007),
suggesting that some interorganizational associations are the
result of Darwinian selection and survivor bias.  Here, the
selection process, when applied to either the relationship as a
whole or a specific interfirm initiative, is influenced by
individual partner actions, by viable alternatives for the buyer
and/or supplier, and by external market adversities.  Future
research should evaluate the impact of Darwinian selection
factors on buyer and supplier choices, the evolution of supply
chain relationships, and their outcomes.
Ultimately work needs to expand the unit of analysis from
dyadic relationships to business networks (Straub et al.
2004b; Tapscott et al. 2000).  Such an approach should yield
insight into how network topologies and relational ties along
with their IT enablers shape cooperative behaviors as well as
the creation and appropriation of value.  While studies that
embrace this business network approach offer significant
promise for novel contributions, the inherent complexities and
subsequent difficulties in collecting and examining data
expand exponentially with the inclusion of growing numbers
of network participants (Iacobucci and Hopkins 1992).
Conclusion
We theorize and provide evidence that flows of strategic
information from buyer to supplier and from supplier to buyer
in logistics relationships yield performance gains for both
parties.  When a lead logistics provider and its buyers share
strategic information, both parties gain in terms of financial
performance (e.g., operating costs, asset management, and
productivity) and in terms of improvement to capabilities
(e.g., production planning, resource control, and process
flexibility).  Thus, while the sharing of transactional infor-
mation is necessary to streamline transactional exchanges
(Lee et al. 2000), the sharing of strategic information can be
leveraged to generate additional rents.  There are important
conditions that promote the flows of strategic information
between a vendor and buyer.  First, buyer dependence pro-
vides an incentive for the buyer to strive for greater
complementarities of resources and coordination of strategic
initiatives with the supplier and, consequently, to share
strategic information with the supplier.  Second, asset-specific
IT investments that customize IT resources to the relationship
establish the digital mechanisms for the exchange of unstruc-
tured, sensitive, and relationship-specific strategic informa-
tion.  Third, and finally, trusting beliefs related to the ability,
benevolence, and integrity of the receiving party address
concerns of opportunism, thus promoting the exchange of
strategic information.
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Strategic Information Flows Buyer to Supplier Supplier to Buyer
Our organization shares the following types of information with this
business partner:
• Inventory/capacity planning 1–7 2.86 2.61 1–7 5.23 .96
• Production schedules 1–7 3.12 1.80 1–7 5.00 1.08
• Cost structures 1–7 2.73 2.15 1–7 4.59 1.21
• Margin structures 1–7 2.40 2.71 1–7 4.67 1.22
• Marketing strategies 1–7 3.31 1.96 1–7 5.07 .67
• Demand patterns 1–7 3.01 2.05
• Decision-making processes 1–7 2.85 2.33
• Decision-making criteria 1–7 2.90 1.89
• Pricing schedules plans 1–7 4.99 1.30
• Product/services in development 1–7 5.10 1.80
• Support strategies 1–7 4.80 1.10
Relationship-Specific Performance Buyer Supplier
Our organization has realized the following performance outcomes
as a result of our interactions with this business partner:
• Improved asset management 1–7 4.77 1.54 1–7 3.97 1.56
• Increased productivity 1–7 4.98 1.55 2–7 4.07 1.61
• Lower operating costs 1–7 5.09 1.55 1–7 4.07 1.66
• Improved production planning 1–7 5.05 1.51 1–7 4.19 1.66
• Improved resource control 1–7 4.84 1.61 1–7 3.98 1.61
• Increased flexibility 2–7 5.13 1.57 1–7 4.10 1.70
Buyer Dependence on Supplier Buyer
N/A:  data collected from one
logistics vendor
• Percentage of our overall logistics needs serviced by this
business partner.
1–10 6.67 2.207
Buyer IT Customization Buyer
N/A:  data collected from one
logistics vendor
• Our organization uses uniquely built or customized, rather than
canned or generic, applications to facilitate information
exchanges with our partner.
1–7 4.48 1.73
• The applications that are used to facilitate information
exchanges with our partner can be described on a scale from
generic to customized.
1–7 4.46 1.66
• What percentage of applications are customized, i.e., developed
expressly to manage interactions and flows of information
between your organization and this business partner?*
1–7 3.77 1.57
*The third IT customization item employed a 10-point ordinal scale that specified the percentages of applications from 0–10% to 91–100%. 
For analysis, this measure was rescaled to a 1-7 range, so that all three items for IT customization ranged from 1 through 7.
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Trusting Beliefs Buyer in Supplier Supplier in Buyer
Ability
• Our business partner is competent and effective in their
interactions with our organization.
2–7 4.74 1.55 2–7 4.51 1.71
• Our business partner performs all of their roles very well. 2–7 4.97 1.52 2–7 4.53 1.58
• Overall, this business partner is capable and proficient. 2–7 4.98 1.53 2–7 4.56 1.50
• In general, this business partner is knowledgeable about their
industry and business operations.
2–7 4.98 1.58 2–7 4.62 1.86
Benevolence
• Our organization believes that this business partner would act in
our best interest.
2–7 5.47 1.45 2–7 4.58 1.63
• If our organization required help, this business partner would do
their best to provide assistance.
2–7 5.42 1.57 2–7 4.66 1.63
• This business partner is interested in our organization’s well
being and not just its own.
2–7 5.30 1.52 2–7 4.82 1.56
Integrity
• This business partner is truthful in their dealings with our
organization.
2–7 5.34 1.37 2–7 4.88 1.52
• Our organization would characterize this business partner as
being honest.
3–7 5.49 1.26 2–7 4.90 1.58
• This business partner keeps their commitments. 2–7 5.24 1.39 1–7 4.74 1.58
• This business partner is sincere and genuine. 2–7 5.18 1.36 2–7 4.91 1.61
Appendix B
ANOVA Test for Nonresponse Bias
(1)  Early Versus Late Respondents
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(2)  Responding Versus Nonresponding Client Firms
Factor Group Sum of Squares Mean Square F Sig.



























(3)  Responding Versus Nonresponding Vendor Representative
Factor Group Sum of Squares Mean Square F Sig.



























(4)  Unmatched Versus Matched Vendor Respondents
Factor Group Sum of Squares Mean Square F Sig.































































760 MIS Quarterly Vol. 33 No. 4/December 2009
Klein & Rai/Strategic Information Flows
Appendix C
Exploratory Factor Analysis Results
Items Dimension 1 2 3 4 5 6
BTS1
Ability, Buyer in Supplier
.71 .22 .25 .03 -.09 .10
BTS2 .80 .29 .28 .12 -.10 .14
BTS3 .76 .30 .33 .18 -.21 .13
BTS4 .84 .31 .26 .21 -.07 .12
BTS5
Benevolence, Buyer in Supplier
.31 .69 .22 .02 .19 .17
BTS6 .22 .72 .24 .01 .18 .13
BTS7 .29 .64 .22 .19 .01 .14
BTS8
Integrity, Buyer in Supplier
.27 .17 .73 .07 .01 .05
BTS9 .21 .23 .80 .05 .01 -.03
BTS10 .20 .18 .76 .04 .02 .03
BTS11 .18 .20 .69 .05 .01 -.02
STB1
Ability, Supplier in Buyer
-.05 -.01 .13 .68 .21 .31
STB2 -.02 .01 .14 .68 .31 .26
STB3 -.09 -.01 .19 .72 .21 .22
STB4 -.08 .02 .09 .78 .31 .31
STB5
Benevolence, Supplier in Buyer
.19 .01 .02 .35 .89 .27
STB6 .18 -.06 .01 .21 .69 .38
STB7 .10 -.02 .03 .29 .78 .32
STB8
Integrity, Supplier in Buyer
.09 .07 .01 .19 .47 .66
STB9 .14 .05 .01 .31 .33 .77
STB10 .10 .04 .03 .21 .38 .69
STB11 .09 .07 .02 .27 .22 .80
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